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REGULATING INDEPENDENT GAS PRODUCERS:
THE FIRST AREA ATTEMPT
No longer is the Federal Power Commission the reluctant dragon
that, in 1954, futilely argued its lack of jurisdiction over independent
producers of natural gas.' No longer is the Commission the paunchy
and slowfooted governess who, in 1959, had to be reprimanded for
letting her charges get "out of line." 2 Since that time the Commission
has rejuvenated its approach, scrapping outmoded procedures and
eliminating awesome docket backlogs.' What was probably the out-
standing example in the federal government of the breakdown of the
administrative process 4 has been substantially repaired. The Com-
mission is literally pursuing its regulatory office to the bottoms of
the wells.'
The innovation most necessary to the Commission's new facility
of regulation, however, has yet to be passed upon by any court. The
first area rate proceeding, establishing uniform ceiling and floor prices
for natural gas sold in Texas' Permian Basin,' is presently awaiting
decision in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Permian, a
massive evidentiary hearing,7 will in its final posture provide a model
1 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
2 See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Conim'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959) (Catco).
The Catco case is discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying notes 29-31,
77-80 infra.
3 See Freeman, Administrative Reform of FPC Natural Gas Regulation, Pub.
Util. Fort., Feb. 18, 1965, p. 34, 36:
The commission in the past three years has completely cleared up the
enormous backlog of pipeline rate cases, and in the process over $550 million in
pipeline refunds have been ordered and the city gate price of natural gas
throughout the country has been reduced by a net amount of over $124 million
annually. In addition, settlements of producer increases have increased the
total in refunds to well over $600 million in the past three years. To my
knowledge these sums are larger than any other regulatory agency has ordered
returned to utility customers in a comparable period in the history of regu-
lation.
See also Swidler, The Public Interest in Effective Natural Gas Regulation, Pub. Util.
Fort., Oct. 8, 1964, p. 34. Examples of the procedural streamlining which has wrought
these results are the requirement that parties seeking § 4 rate increases, see note 10
infra and accompanying text, must file all proof at once in a form reviewable by
Staff and interested parties, periodic test audits of companies' books and the elimination
of time-wasting internal procedures. See Freeman, supra at 37.
4 See notes 12, 33 infra and accompanying text.
5 In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392 (1965),
the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's asserted jurisdiction over a producer's
sale to a pipeline of leases covering proven gas reserves. Thus the sale of an estate
in land was held to be a sale of gas for resale in interstate commerce.
I Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTiLrrY LAW REPORT No. 689
(FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
7 Freeman, supra note 3, at 37. The examiner entertained some 30,000 pages
of testimony. Francis, Area Price Regulation of Gas Producer Rates by the Federal
Power Commission, 68 DicK. L. REv. 237, 249 (1964).
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for the remaining in a series of area proceedings which, the Commission
hopes, will ultimately stabilize the initial step of interstate gas com-
merce, the producer's sale to the pipeline.
The success of Permian depends to a great extent upon court
acceptance of several novel regulatory devices. That these devices
would be of deserved benefit to the consumer of natural gas is obvious.
Equally obvious is the Supreme Court's sympathy with the Com-
mission's regulatory problems; yet the Court will find it difficult to
accept some of these innovations.
I. HISTORY: THE ROOTS OF THE THICKET
Joinder in the endless debate whether the Natural Gas Act of
1938 should regulate in-state sales by independent producers for resale
in interstate commerce is unnecessary-certainly the act was not
well designed for that task. Section 7 of the act, to be sure, allows
the Commission to withhold initial certification of a filed sales contract
pending a determination that the rate serves "the public convenience
8 The debate is one fraught with political overtones. For example, after Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), had applied the act's provisions
to independent producers, Congress passed a bill prohibiting the regulation of those
producers. H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). President Eisenhower, who
strongly favored the bill, vetoed it only because
private persons, apparently representing only a very small segment of a great
and vital industry, have been seeking to further their own interests by highly
questionable activities. These include efforts that I deem to be so arrogant
and so much in defiance of acceptable standards of propriety as to risk creating
doubt among the American people concerning the integrity of the governmental
processes ....
H.R. Doc. No. 342, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). The interplay of the various interest
groups in this matter, both on and off the congressional floor, is discussed and ex-
cerpted in READ, MAcDONALD & FORDRAM, CASES ON LEGIsLATIoN 559-636 (2d ed.
1959).
A similar bill had been passed as preventive medicine in 1950, Kerr-Harris Bill,
H.R. 1758, 8 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), and President Truman vetoed it. H.R. Doc.
No. 555, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1950). Senator Paul Douglas gives the following
account of the aftermath:
[A]fter the completion of a thorough field survey, there was a change of
opinion within the Commission and the majority took a stand against the Kerr
Bill. President Truman reappointed one of the members of the Commission
who had taken a stand against the Kerr Bill. But the Senate refused to ratify
this appointment.
Then there was a reverse switch inside the Commission which, with the
appointment of a new member, changed a three to two majority for regulation
into a four to one majority against regulation. Shortly afterwards the remain-
ing member . . . was denied reappointment by the White House after the
change of administrations and resigned shortly before his term expired.
Douglas, The Case for the Conmaner of Natural Gas, 44 GEo. L. REv. 566, 573 (1956).
The Permian hearing itself was not entirely free from such overtones:
Last week the big Texas petroleum interests brought in Governor John Con-
nally, the President's own home state sidekick, to warn the Federal Power
Commission that should it reduce the price of natural gas, the young and
vibrant state of Texas itself might founder.
The New Republic, Feb. 20, 1965, p. 11.
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and necessity"; 9 such a provision is workable even in a world where
certificate filings are so many and time consuming as to defy careful
review without serious docket delay. But section 4, dealing with
proposed rate increases under existing section 7 certificates, is in-
adequate on its face. That section gives the Commission only five
months in which to hold a rate in abeyance while determining its
propriety." Beyond this the only consumer safeguard is the Com-
mission's power to condition the increase on the posting of a refund
bond, to be used in the event that the increase is ultimately found
improper." In practice this refund obligation has done little to benefit
the consumer and has caused widespread confusion throughout the
industry. Probably, too, the provision contributed to the increment
of rates, as millions of dollars were held in escrow 1 with no certainty
as to their final disposition beyond the fact that the ultimate consumer
was unlikely ever to see his money again.
But the failure of effective producer rate regulation must also
be attributed to several other factors, one of which is the economic
position of the independent producer. Concurrently with the post
9 Natural Gas Act §§ 7(c), (e), 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§717f(c), (e) (1964):
(c) No natural-gas company . .. shall engage in the transportation or sale
of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . .unless
there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of
public convenience and necessity ....
(e) . . . [A] certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor
. . .if it is found that the applicant is able and willing properly . . .
to perform the service proposed and to conform to the provisions of
this chapter and the requirements, rules, and regulations of the Com-
mission thereunder, and that the proposed service . . . is or will be
required by the present or future public convenience and necessity; other-
wise such application shall be denied.
10 Natural Gas Act §§4(d), (e), 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§717c(d), (e)
(1964):
(d) . . . [N]o change shall be made . . . except after thirty days' notice
to the Commission and to the public ...
(e) Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have
authority . . . to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of
such rate . . . [and] pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the
Commission . . .may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer
the use of such rate . . . but not for a longer period than five months
beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect . . . Where
increased rates . . .are thus made effective, the Commission may . . .
require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond . . . to refund any
amounts ordered by the Commission ....
11 Ibid.
12 See, e.g., Swidler, The Challenge of Natural Gas Regulation, in AMERICAN
BAR Ass'N, 1962-63 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF MINERAL AND NATURAL RE-
souRCEs LAw 2-3:
We have still pending before the Commission one pipeline rate case in
which sums collected subject to refund over a period of years approaches
[sic] the staggering figure of $400 million, and the amount increases at the
rate of $9 million a month.
Compare note 3 supra.
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World War II explosion in demand for natural gas,13 various decisions
of the Supreme Court made it advantageous for the gas pipelines to
deal with the as yet unregulated independent producers, rather than
with their own affiliates.' 4 Meanwhile, the FPC requirement that
pipelines obtain access to reserves adequate to meet demands of the
distant future ' insured that demand would outstrip supply. Inde-
pendent producers were thus able to insist on higher prices "6 and
devices such as escalation and most favored nation clauses, under
which the producer was guaranteed a rate equal to the highest paid
any producer in the area. For the first time pipelines felt forced to
compete with each other in various parts of the country. Frequently,
to gain purchasing access to a producing area, they applied "block-
busting" techniques, agreeing to purchase at rates greatly in excess
of those currently paid in the area." The most favored nation clauses
would then, of course, correspondingly "trigger" all rates in the area.
A final frustrating element lay in the then impossibility of directing
a search for gas alone, rather than in combination with oil.'" Since
such combined deposits yielded, on the average, far more oil than
gas, and since oil was in earlier times a more marketable commodity,' 9
increased gas prices could not spur the search for new gas in such a
way as to allow the market to adjust itself at lower competitive rates.
The extent of searching, drilling and production depended upon the
market for oil.
In time the production field came to be dominated by a number
of giant producers, while a mass of relatively tiny independents rode
13 In earlier times, when oil was the dominant interest of the driller, natural gas
was often flared off at the wellhead, because the driller considered it worthless and,
indeed, a liability. The explosion in demand for gas is discussed in Connole, General
Considerations: A Nation's Natural-Gas Pains, 44 GEo. L.J. 555-56 (1956); Cram,
Introduction to the Problems of Developing Adequate Supplies of Natural Gas, in
INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS EDUCATIONAL CENTER, EcoNoMIcs OF THE GAS INDUSTRY
1-3 (1962) ; LeBoeuf, Chaos in the Natural-Gas Industry from the Distributor View-
point, 44 GEo. L.J. 607, 608 (1956).
14 See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947) ; Colorado Inter-
state Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945) ; FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591 (1944).
15 Douglas, supra note 8, at 584; cf. Netschert, Economic Aspects of Natural Gas
Supply, in INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS EDUCATIONAL CENTER, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 27, 67.
16 See Permian Area Rates, No. AR61-1, FPC, Sept. 17, 1964, p. 18 (Examiner's
decision) :
Between 1947 and 1960 the average price paid by pipelines for gas trebled,
from 4.95 cents to 15.61 cents. Even after adjusting for changes in the pur-
chasing power of the dollar, prices in 1960 were some 2.3 times their 1947 level.
Accord, Netschert, supra note 15, at 67.
.7 Permian Area Rates, No. AR61-1, FPC, Sept. 17, 1964, pp. 20-22 (Examiner's
decision).
18 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 649 (1944) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting) ; see Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPORT
No. 689 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
19 Cf. Douglas, supra note 8, at 590-91; Netschert, supra note 15, at 37; authorities
cited note 13 supra.
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their bargaining coattails.2" The pipelines, having heavy investments
in costly apparatus,21 were often willing to meet increased rate demands
rather than seek new supply sources and lay new lines. Several other
factors made these pipelines poor bargaining agents for the ultimate
consumer. The original field price of gas is but a component of its
ultimate consumer cost; so a producer rate increase might not be
strongly felt by either the consumer or the distributor. Further, the
pipelines had gas monopolies of their consumer markets.2 2 Finally,
the homeowner's costs in changing from one fuel system to another
would probably prohibit his taking his business elsewhere. The pipe-
line could readily pass its cost increases down to the final buyer; a
monopoly-holding middleman insulated the seller from the consumer.
When, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,23 independent
producers did come under FPC regulation, a reluctant Commission did
not question the validity of most favored nation clauses. The in-
evitable result was a deluge of rate increase filings from the many
producers.' This alone might have defeated any hope of efficient
producer regulation. That defeat was made certain by the Com-
mission's attempt to judge rate filings case by case, by the cost-of-
service standard.2 5
Mr. Justice Jackson stated what should have been the obvious
when he faulted the individual cost-of-service standard as a gas
producer yardstick.25 The producer of the forties and fifties, unable to
direct a gas search efficiently, was a gambler whose costs of ex-
ploration and drilling bore little if any relation to the actual value of
his product. Further, the individual cost-of-service standard seems
20 Cf. text accompanying notes 88, 95 infra.
21 The cost of pipeline has been estimated at from $40,000 to $100,000 per mile.
Douglas, supra note 8, at 577. In Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360
U.S. 378, 383 (1959) (Catco), which dealt with offshore oil finds, the Supreme Court
noted that in reliance on the sale, the pipeline interest had built installations at an
estimated cost of $85,000,000.
22 See Douglas, supra note 8, at 583. Compare LeBoeuf, supra note 13, at 610-11.
23 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
24 Cf. note 33 infra.
25 It is difficult to place blame squarely upon either the approach or the way in
which it was effected. Compare note 26 infra, with Netschert, Natural Gas Price
Regulation: The Consumer Viewpoint, Pub. Util. Fort., Oct. 8, 1964, p. 63, 68:
One of the major issues here is the relative workability of the individual com-
pany versus the area rate approach. As I see it, both are workable; and as
I understand the motivation of the Federal Power Commission in abandoning
the individual company approach, it was not because regulation could not be
carried on, but because it had not been. The mountainous backlog was there,
the problem of staleness was acute, and something had to be done en masse to
get current again.
One case clearly demonstrating the plethora of issues that must be (or were) enter-
tained in an individual cost-of-service case is Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 19 F.P.C.
463, 467 (1958).
26 The service one renders to society in the gas business is measured by what
he gets out of the ground, not by what he puts into it, and there is little more
relation between the investment and the results than in a game of poker.
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 649 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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uniquely suited to multiply the woes of an overworked agency; the
standard brings into question the producer's entire financial structure
for the most incidental of contested sales.2 7 Moreover, such a standard
probably encourages evidentiary verbosity; both sides will throw in
every conceivable shred of data in an attempt to color the total cost
picture.
28
Ultimately the Commission threw up its hands and attempted to
abdicate. Faced with a large sale at a rate which would trigger large
increases throughout the South Louisiana area, it accepted the pro-
ducer's rate rather than risk the loss of the gas to the public. The
Commission construed section 7's "public convenience and necessity"
to require, primarily, that a large reserve of gas be maintained for
the interstate consumer.' The Third Circuit's reversal' 0 was affirmed
by the Supreme Court on the theory that the Commission had a duty
to avoid insupportable price increases.
Where the proposed price is not in keeping with the public
interest because it is out of line or because its approval might
result in a triggering of general price rises or an increase
in the applicant's existing rates by reason of "favored nation"
clauses or otherwise, the Commission in the exercise of its
discretion might attach such conditions as it believes
necessary.
This is not an encroachment upon the initial rate-making
privileges allowed natural gas companies under the Act . . .
but merely the exercise of that duty imposed on the Com-
mission to protect the public interest in determining whether
the issuance of the certificate is required by the public con-
venience and necessity . . . .
It is not surprising, in light of the docket backlog, that it was
not until 1960 that the Commission got around to dealing with that
particular group of producers which the Supreme Court had first
ordered it to regulate in 1954.32 At last the Commission acknowledged
27 See, e.g., Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 19 F.P.C. 463 (1958).
28 See Swidler, supra note 12, at 3.
29 Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 880, 881-82 (1957). The producers were before
the Commission for the third time, having twice been offered temporary or conditioned
certificates and rejected them. The precise question in the case was whether the Com-
mission should insist on its plan of issuing an initial certificate at the price it thought
proper, while allowing the producers to increase their rate tventy-four hours later,
subject to the "just and reasonable" refund conditions of § 4, or whether the § 7 certifi-
cate should be given at the high rate, subject only to a Commission-initiated hearing
on the rate's "justness" and "reasonableness" under § 5 of the act, 52 Stat. 822 (1938),
15 U.S.C. § 717d (1964), quoted at note 80 infra. In the latter event, which is what
occurred, the Commission would have no refund power pending its § 5 determination.
30 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1958).
81 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1959) (Catco).
(Emphasis added.)
82 Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
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the failure of its case-by-case cost-of-service approach, cataloging its
woes in detail. 8 Its remedy was to divide the producing gas fields into
several areas and to launch area rate proceedings which would set a
proper rate for gas sold in each." Permian was the first such
proceeding.
II. THE TwO-PRICE SYSTEM: TIME AND COST AVERAGING
The Permian "just and reasonable rates" were ultimately bot-
tomed in "composite costs" of gas production.35  The producers' costs
of finding, developing and providing service from their wells were
analyzed and averaged. 6  Court approval of the concept of average
cost-based ratemaking seems assured by both prior decisions and
logic; 31 the inefficient producer should not have the right to sell his
gas at a profit to the detriment of the consumer.3" Furthermore, the
Commission seems to have taken adequate precautions that no pro-
33Id. at 545-46:
An illustration of the administrative impossibility of separate determinations
for all producers' rates is found in the fact that there are 3,372 independent
producers with rates on file with this Commission. The producers have on
file with us 11,091 rate schedules and 33,231 supplements to these schedules.
Currently, 570 of these producers are involved in 3,278 producer rate increase
filings now under suspension and awaiting hearings and decisions. The num-
ber of completions of independent producer rate cases per man-year during
the first 6 years following the Phillips decision indicate that nearly 13 years
would be required for our present staff to dispose of the 2,313 cases pending
on July 1, 1960. Within this 13-year period an additional estimated 6,500
cases would have been received.
Thus, if our present staff were immediately tripled, and if all new em-
ployees would be as competent as those we now have, we would not reach
a current status in our independent producer rate work until 2043 A.D.-
eighty-two and one-half years from now. . . . If we increased our efficiency
one thousand percent, we would achieve current status in 1968-eight and
two-tenths years from now.
The rejection of individual cost-of-service regulation was upheld in Wisconsin v.
FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 310 (1963).
34 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960). Details of the
Statement's execution have been amended several times. E.g., 24 F.P.C. 902 (1960) ;
24 F.P.C. 1107 (1960). The Permian Basin, actually, is only one of several areas
being regulated in the Permian proceeding. Thus references in text to the Permian
Basin should be taken to mean that and all other areas taken in by the proceeding.
35 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTLrrY LAw REPORT No. 689,
at 35-39 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
36 Id. at 78-80. The cost of gas already brought to the market was determined
with reference only to the producers' costs in the Permian area. Id. at 80-81. The
New Gas price, discussed herein, was based upon national cost estimates. While
the Commission recognized that production costs of New Gas might vary sufficiently
in some areas to justify different treatment, no such variance was felt to be necessary
in the Permian Basin price. Id. at 38.
37 See Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ; Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 549, 566-68 (1962).
38 The Supreme Court has stated more than once that the inefficient or unpro-
ductive producer has no constitutional or statutory right to be guaranteed a profit by
virtue of his regulated status. E.g., Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426, 431 (1936) :
"[R]egulation cannot be frustrated by a requirement that the rate be made to com-
pensate extravagant or unnecessary costs . . . ." Compare the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Jackson in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 37, at 649.
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ducer will be forced to continue selling gas at a confiscatory-less than
individual costs-rate.
39
But gas sale contracts, because of the nature of gas production
and the FPC reserve requirements, are novel in their longevity; " thus
the Commission was setting a just and reasonable rate for gas, flowing
in 1960, which had originally been dedicated to commerce as early
as 1940."' At the same time, it was setting a rate for gas to be dedi-
cated in the future ' which had to be high enough to insure the
continued bringing of gas to the interstate market. 3 Since the industry
had recently developed "directionality"-the ability to direct a search
for gas alone, rather than in combination with oil 4--a high profit
return could encourage the finding of gas. For these reasons the
Commission promulgated a two-price system, one price being applicable
only to "Gas Well Gas" found after January 1, 1961.45  The rate for
this gas, found in a well whose primary function is to provide gas
alone, was based upon the estimated costs of originally bringing gas
to the market place after 1960.46 A "Flowing Gas" rate, substantially
lower, was to be paid for gas originally dedicated before 1961,17 as
well as for gas, whenever dedicated, produced from wells whose
primary function is to provide oil. 8
In general, the idea of making rates depend upon the time of
finding is a good one; the consumer should not pay today's prices for
gas produced at yesterday's costs. Moreover, the goal of encouraging
gas production would not be served by paying a premium to the oil
producer who finds gas at the bottom of his well, available to the
consumer only in proportion to the market for oil. 9 But the Com-
mission's method of setting the Flowing Gas rate gives rise to ir-
39 The Commission will, in such cases, allow either abandonment or a rate increase
if warranted. See note 150 infra and accompanying text.
40 In this aspect the natural gas situation differs radically from those industries
as to which average rate regulation has been upheld. E.g., New York v. United
States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947) (railroad rates) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381 (1940) (coal) ; United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 (1936) (stock-
yards); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (milk).
41 Permian Area Rates, No. AR61-1, FPC, Sept. 17, 1964, App. C at 34a-36a
(Examiner's decision).
42 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTnmrrY LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 1 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
43 See id. at 30-32, 56.
44 Id. at 28.
45 Id. at 33-35.
4 6 Id. at 34. This seems to have been tantamount to applying 1960 costs across
the board, since the Commission adverted to its finding that costs have been stable
since 1958. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
47 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTIUrY LAw REPORT No. 689,
at 29-32, 78-80 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
48 Id. at 71-74.
49 See id. at 70-71, 76.
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rational differences in the profit returns of various Permian Basin
producers of average efficiency and, if followed in other area proceed-
ings, will probably cause similar differences among the different gas
producing areas.
The Gas Well Gas rate (New Gas rate) was determined by
estimating the average costs of producing gas found in 1960, while
the Flowing Gas rate (Old Gas rate) was set on the basis of the
"composite historical costs" of all gas flowing in 1960.50 The Com-
mission, on the basis of these composite costs, determined that on
the average, Flowing Gas had been produced at 84%. of the cost of
1960-dedicated gas.5' A discussion of this finding, or of the propriety
of the Commission's decision that both Old and New Gas rates should
include a profit return of 12% on costs, 2 is beyond the scope of this
Comment. The quarrel is with the finding of costs.
Evidence entertained by the hearing examiner indicated that the
costs of producing natural gas have risen sharply since at least 1947."a
Since these costs are typically capitalized by the producer over the life
of his production contract," his present cost of delivering gas to the
pipeline will vary substantially depending upon the year in which he
originally found his well.55 If, then, a determination of proper rates
utilizes the average production costs of all gas found between 1947
and 1960, as Permian's does, two things must follow: the average
1947 producer will be credited with costs radically higher, and the
1960 producer with costs substantially lower, than those he actually
incurred. Furthermore, these capitalized cost attributions will exert
substantial downward or upward pressure on the final rate itself, since
historical (capitalized) costs make up over two-thirds of the Permian
rate base upon which return is computed. 6 Thus, if the 1948 pro-
ducer's capitalized costs are actually 62.4%, rather than 84%, of 1960
original capitalized costs, he is being credited with a 21.6% "bonus" in
terms of those 1960 costs. Reflected in a rate based on total production
o Id. at 78-80. The term "New Gas" applies to Gas Well Gas produced since
1961; "Old Gas" is synonymous with "Flowing Gas" and refers to all gas originally
dedicated prior to the inception of the Perinian hearing in 1961. The "Old Gas rate,"
or "Flowing Gas rate," however, is applicable to all oil well gas dedicated subsequent
to 1961. See notes 45, 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
51 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILTrY LAW REPoRT No. 689,
at 91 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
52The problem is an obscure one. The various parties had recommended returns
of from 9.5 to 18%. Id. at 55-66.
53 Permian Area Rates, No. AR61-1, FPC, Sept. 17, 1964, pp. 78-81, App. C
at 34a-42a (Examiner's decision) ; see Table I, p. 115 infra.
54Cf. Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW RE oRT No.
689, at 37-38 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965). Compare id. at 90.
55 Table II, p. 115 infra, illustrates the hearing examiner's finding that a sub-
stantial percentage of the gas flowing in 1960 was in fact found in the earlier low
cost years.
56 Compare the following details of the New and Flowing Gas rates as set by the
Commission:
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costs, this bonus would add almost 15% to the total production costs
rate base. 7 To the same effect, if the 1959 producer is assumed to
have incurred actual capitalized costs of about 91.8% "' of 1960
capitalized costs, then about 7.8%, of his actual capitalized cost is not
being attributed to him, reflecting a 5.2% diminution of his total rate
base and, correspondingly, his profit. Results such as these are quite
a different matter from a holding merely that the inefficient producer
should not expect to profit; rather they say that the quantum of profit
to which the producer of average efficiency is entitled depends upon
when his gas was found. Granting that the producer, being a gambler,
should not be paid more for his product than is the producer of average
efficiency, there appears to be little defense for a rate-setting standard
which forces the average 1960 producer to maintain a higher level
of efficiency than the 1947 producer in order to earn a comparable
return.
One answer to this argument would be impossibility. If the
annual costs could not be found, or were so difficult of ascertainment
as to render the Permian proceeding virtually interminable, there would
be little sense in ordering the Commission to find them. It is to
this argument that the Commission turned. "The alternative of a
separate cost study for each of the years . . .would have presented
New Gas Flowing Gas
Exploration and Development Costs
Dry Holes $ 1.42 $ 1.42
Other Exploratory Costs 1.59 1.59
Adjustment for Exploration in
Excess of Production 1.11 1.11
Production Operating Expense 2.70 2.70
Net Liquid Credit (3.10) (3.10)
Regulatory Expense .14 .14
Depletion, Depreciation and Amorti-
zation of Production Investment Costs
Successful Well Costs 2.88 2.42
Lease Acquisition Costs .76 .64
Cost of Other Production Facilities .31 .26
Return on Production Investment
(at 12%) 5.21 4.38
Return on Working Capital .35 .35
Subtotal $13.37 $11.91
Royalty at 12.5% 2.05 1.83
Production Taxes 1.01 .90
ToTAL $16.43 $14.64
Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPORT No. 689, at 40,
93 (FPC Aug. 5. 1965). The royalty and production components have not been
included in the tabulation, since these items, though cost-related, are only estimates
of what the producer will pay to others on the basis of his actual rate. These items
thus cast no reflection upon the compensatoriness of the rates. Each of the varying
items is, in the case of Flowing Gas, equal to 84% of the corresponding New Gas
item, rounded off to the nearest 1/100th of a cent.
57 See the chart in note 56 supra.
58 These hypothetical producer costs are the ones most charitable to the position
that costs have not climbed radically, both being taken from the estimate showing
the less steep increment in costs. See Table I, p. 115 infra.
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an almost impossible task. At best it would have prolonged this
proceeding greatly." "
But it is difficult to reconcile this conclusion with the facts. The
hearing examiner, while he had not specifically relied upon year-by-
year costs of finding gas, did make extensive use of the statistical
evidence set out in Table I below." The Commission, too, disclaimed
reliance upon these tables, relying instead on the Staff's "composite
historical costs index." 61 While each of these studies reached a
different set of conclusions as to the precise cost of finding gas in
a given year, all showed substantial increments in finding costs between
1947 and 1960.62 Each broke these increments into year-by-year steps.
The Commission's decision can, of course, be defended on the
ground that the various exhibits did yield greatly varying conclusions
as to the costs of production in specific years; 63 thus all of the
annual costs evidence might be assailed as inherently unreliable. But
the Commission did rely upon the evidence and concluded that the
Staff's and the examiner's cost finding methods yielded similar results.
64
Instead of relying upon the annual data, the Commission lumped them
all together and estimated the average costs. Thus, if the evidence
was unreliable, the Commission compounded its unreliability.
The related argument, that a precise determination of these
annual costs would have taken too much time, must also fail. If the
annual costs evidence did nothing else, it pointed out the probability
that costs had risen over the years; the Commission had a duty to
plumb that issue. Annual costs evidence had already been enter-
tained from various opposing parties, who seemed generally to agree
that costs had risen precipitously, 5 and it is not likely that making
findings on that evidence would, in the context of a four and one-half
year proceeding, have caused much relative delay. Finally, it seems
obvious in context that even a series of rough guesses at annual costs
would have come closer to the goal of just and reasonable rates than
would a rigid finding of one cost, applied to a span of years over
which costs have obviously varied substantially.
The Commission, however, concluded that such annual findings
would not make much difference in the rates ultimately set:
59 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 80 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
60 Permian Area Rates, No. AR61-1, FPC, Sept. 17, 1964, pp. 78-81, App. C
at 34a-42a (Examiner's decision). Table I is at p. 115 infra.
01 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 79 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
62 Ibid.; Table I, p. 115 infra.
63 See Tables I & II, p. 115 infra.
64Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 79, 89-93 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
65Ibid. While this testimony was not, of course, conclusive, it is noteworthy
that absolutely no evidence was submitted in refutation of the premise that costs had
so risen.
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The basic evidence utilized in Staff's composite cost
presentation was collected for 1960. In addition, certain
trend information was obtained for prior years. These and
related data reveal that the 1960 level of costs is fairly repre-
sentative of the costs during the three year period ending in
1960. While unit costs were somewhat lower in the earlier
years, they leveled off in 1958 and so far as the evidence shows
have never since exceeded this level. The 1960 test year is,
therefore, typical of current and future costs of the flowing
gas and it is also more than fair to the producers as a basis
for just and reasonable prices for the prior years when costs
were slightly lower. [A finding of average annual costs]
• was not justified since little gas was selling in the
1954-57 period at prices even approaching our ceiling as
established herein. 6
Two problems arise: first, the Commission makes much of the fact
that costs have not risen substantially between 1958 and 1960 or,
perhaps, the present. But the 1958-1960 producer is not being allowed
a rate based on average 1958-1960 costs; he is receiving a rate based
on average 1947-1960 costs-the Flowing Gas costs. Thus the
1958-1960 figures, far from aiding the Commission's position as to
the propriety of the Flowing Gas rate, weaken it by indicating that
the 1958 producer probably incurred costs roughly equal to those
of the producer enjoying the New Gas rate. Yet the earlier producer's
rate is based upon only 84% of the costs both presumably incurred.
Perhaps, on the other hand, the Commission is referring only to
Flowing Gas costs in making its statement that costs have not in-
creased substantially since 1958. If so, the statement is meaningless.
Obviously composite historical costs will increase only in small pro-
portion to the amount that current costs increase; each annual
increment will be diluted in the stewpot of historical costs.
Second, the Commission, for some inscrutable reason, seems most
interested in showing that earlier finders of gas will not be injured by
Permian's Flowing Gas rate. Of course they will not; it is the latter
day finder, as well as the consumer, who will suffer. To the extent
that the annual costs evidence is correct, it shows that the early
producer will get a windfall under the Permian scheme. If the rate
is still high enough to compensate the 1960 producer, that windfall
is enormous, and the consumer will suffer accordingly. If it is, in its
totality, fair to the consumer, the latter day producer is being robbed.
A variant of the historical cost problem is only theoretical at this
early date: other area proceedings have begun since Permian's in-
6Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILrry LA-,w REPORT No. 689,
at 80 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965). (Emphasis added.)
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ception. South Louisiana,67 like Permian, uses 1960 as its "test"
year. But two other proceedings, Hugoton-Anadarko and Texas Gulf
Coast,6" will be considering 1962 costs as determinative. The Com-
mission states that costs have remained, and will remain, relatively
stable after 1958 and this, if true, should insure that the Hugoton
New Gas producer will not attract a rate unconscionably higher than
that received by the Permian Basin producer of New Gas. But this
is not the case as to Flowing Gas. Even if contemporary costs remain
precisely the same, there will be more of these recent costs figured into
the Commission's grand equation than there were in Permian. To
like effect, the 1962 test year will probably reflect fewer instances of
Flowing Gas found before 1960. The result will be that the Hugoton
producer of gas found in 1960 or earlier will have generally higher
costs figured into his average historical cost picture-despite actual
costs that are presumably identical-than will the similarly situated
Permian Basin producer.
The final defect of the Commission's use of time-averaged costs
is the sharp discrepancy it produces between 1960 and 1961 gas rates.
If this difference were based upon actual cost differentials, there would
of course be no complaint; that is not this case. Here the 1960 gas
finder's costs have been found and applied to the 1961 finder. The
1960 finder himself, meanwhile, is given the average of his own and
his predecessors' costs. To the extent that there is a cost variance
between 1960 and 1961 gas some rate difference would be justifiable,
even though each rate was based on the costs of a prior year, provided
the rate of cost increase was relatively uniform across the years. Such
a system would serve only to lessen the profit return, uniformly, to
the extent that contemporary costs increased. That, again, is not this
case; no one claims that the 1961 producer's finding costs are so far
above those of 1960 as to justify the Permian difference. To a certain
extent, the difference between 1960 and 1961 rates could also be
justified on the ground that the New Gas rate is to be in effect for
several years, and that it has therefore been set sufficiently high to
absorb anticipated cost increases without injuring the rate's compen-
satoriness. But such a rationale, like that involved in setting the
Flowing Gas rate, can carry only so far. To the extent that it pro-
vides a substantial windfall for the 1961 producer, it should not stand.
In any case, the Commission anticipates no such annual cost increments
in the immediate future.
69
Finally, since 1961 was about the time when the gas producers,
for the first time, were able effectively to direct a search for Gas Well
67 Area Rate Proceeding (South Louisiana Area), 25 F.P.C. 942 (1961).
68 Area Rate Proceeding (Hugoton-Anadarko & Texas Gulf Coast Areas), 30
F.P.C. 1354 (1963).
69 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPoRT No. 689,
at 80, 109 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
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Gas,7" it might be argued that the high rate is justified as an induce-
ment to producers to find the gas required in an expanding market, a
rationale inapplicable to gas already flowing. Indeed, this is the
Commission's primary rationale for the two-price system:
The touchstone of the presiding examiner's decision
is his conclusion that the industry is increasingly becoming
able to direct its exploration efforts toward finding new gas-
well gas as distinguished from finding gas as a by-product in
the search for oil. This new documented ability of the
industry to channel its exploration investment toward either
gas or oil serves as the basis for a pricing system, which we
here adopt, that will make use of the economic drive of the
industry to bring needed gas supplies to consumers at the
lowest reasonable price.
71
But if the New Gas rate is really to be an incentive to exploration,
why should it apply to gas that has already been found and dedicated
to interstate commerce? The Commission gives the following reasons:
that 1960 was the costs test year; that 1961 marks, more or less, the
beginning of search directionality; and that the Commission's 1960
adoption of the area rate approach somehow induced post-1960 pro-
ducers to anticipate a rate that included a bounty component for find-
ing Gas Well Gas.72
The fact that 1960 was the costs test year is of no help to this
disposition; all that factor does is turn us back to the fact that the
rate is cost-based and that the division between 1960 and 1961 prices
is huge. While it rationalizes the 1961 application of the New Gas
rate, it provides no excuse for the 1960-1961 gap. The second reason
given, that search directionality first became possible around 1961,
would also seem irrelevant. The post-1960, pre-1966 producers have
already dedicated their gas to commerce; it is of course impossible to
induce a man to seek that which he has already found. These Permian
producers are being paid, not for what they produced, but for the fact
that they were looking for it when they found it. It would not seem
to be the function of a rate-setting agency to reward or punish its
subjects on the basis of their assumed state of mind, regardless of
their product's quality. Finally, there is the alleged producer "re-
liance" upon an incentive component's being included in the Permian
Basin rates. This is simply not true. Both the Commission and the
general public were well aware that the area rate proceedings were
designed to halt runaway rate increases, not to establish new reward
systems based upon the fact of search directionality.7"
70 Id. at 28.
-7 Ibid.
721d. at 34-35.
78 Id. at 31.
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The foregoing does not mean that the rates for 1961 gas are
necessarily excessive but shows only that the Commission's explanation
of the New Gas rate provides no defense for the great gap between
1960 and 1961 rates. A system by which rates are set on the basis
of costs in the year of discovery, or even on the basis of any group
of years among which the cost differences were not overly large, would
solve this problem as well as the other problems noted above. 4
Permian's rate setting leaves much to be desired. A different
question is whether a reviewing court will find this pricing system to be
within the Commission's discretion. To the earlier decisions, stating
that the Commission is not bound to any particular standard in setting
rates,75 must be added the holding in United Gas Improvement Co. v.
Callery Properties., Inc. 6 That case grew out of the Commission's
refusal, pending the determination of area rates, to hear costs evidence
in individual rate hearings. Instead the Commission applied "guide-
line" prices which had been promulgated in accordance with the
Supreme Court's 1959 order that it not allow rates to get "out of
line." 77 Callery held that the Commission was not bound to entertain
this cost evidence which the producers sought to introduce. Callery
relied substantially on Catco,7" the 1959 "out-of-line" case.
We think the Commission acted lawfully and responsi-
bly in line with . . . CATCO . . . where we held that it
need not permit gas to be sold in the interstate market at
the producer's contract price, pending determination of just
and reasonable rates under § 5. . .. Rather, we held that
there is ample power under § 7(e), to attach appropriate pro-
tective conditions."9
Catco declared that the "public convenience and necessity" stand-
ard of the original certification section, section 7, implied a duty to
see that the rates would not offend the "just and reasonable" standards
of sections 4 and 5.8° Specifically, the case held that the Commission
74 Such a disposition should solve the problems noted as to rate differences
among areas, see notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text, as well as among pro-
ducers in a given area. Thus a proceeding like Hugoton, which uses 1962 as its
test year, could set new annual finding rates only for the years since 1960. It would
also seem that such an approach would greatly simplify the task of the Commission
in subsequent area proceedings, since it could merely apply those annual costs already
found with appropriate local adjustments.
75E.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
76 382 U.S. 223 (1965).
77 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959) (Catco).
78 Ibid.
79 382 U.S. at 227.
so Section 4's provisions are given at note 10 mtpra. Section 5(a) provides for
Commission investigation and correction of existing rates:
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or
upon complaint . . . shall find that any rate, charge, or classification de-
manded, observed, charged or collected by any natural gas company . . . or
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had the power to condition section 7 rates upon the posting of refund
bonds pending the determination of a just and reasonable rate in a
Commission-initiated section 5 investigation.
Obviously Callery goes a long step further, for there the initial
section 7 rate was the "in-line" rate, the rate at which uncontested
sales contracts were presently operating,"' and the producers had
sought to attain a higher "out-of-line" rate subject to a Catco-type
refund condition. In this context the consumer is protected, but there
is no safeguard for the producer against the "in-line" rate's ultimately
being found too low. 2 But both cases make much of the fact that
the "condition" imposed is to be operant only "pending determination
of just and reasonable rates under § 5." " Both decisions were
premised on the fact that section 5 proceedings, in which the Com-
mission can investigate an operant rate and, if it is found too high,
establish a new just and reasonable rate, are occasions of "inordinate
delay" during which the consumer could not be adequately protected.8
4
But the area rate proceedings are themselves section 5 proceed-
ings. In fact, the pending South Louisian area proceeding s seems
to be precisely that section 5 determination of just and reasonable rates
abiding which the Callery "in-line" rates were sustained 7 Callery,
for sound administrative reasons, allowed the Commission to delay
ascertaining with precision the just and reasonable rate; it did not
expunge the producer's or the public's ultimate right to such an
ascertainment.
The time-averaging theory of Permian pricing has a built-in bias
in favor of earlier gas finders and against later ones. The resulting
that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or
classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential,
the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate . . . to be
thereafter observed and in force ....
Natural Gas Act § 5(a), 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1964). See text
accompanying note 84 infra.
81382 U.S. at 227. The rule that gas should be introduced only at rates no higher
than those of Flowing Gas already certificated under § 7 is the "in-line" doctrine.
82 This is especially extreme in light of the way in which the "in-line" price
was reached. Present field prices for gas were assumed to be proper. However, a
"suspect price doctrine" led to the exclusion from this norm of any prices as high as
those being questioned before the courts or the Commission as excessively high. Thus
a price was found to be "out of line" not only by being as high as some insupportable
rate, but by being as high as one that some intervenor had chosen to call into question.
Natural Gas Act § 19(b), 52 Stat. 831 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §717r(b)
(1964), makes such intervention rather easy. The Callery decision also compelled
the producers to give refunds of monies collected beyond the "in-line" rate. 382 U.S.
at 229-30. Thus not even a subsequent determination of a higher just and reasonable
rate could help the producers as to rate payments made before that determination.
83 United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1965) ; Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 392 (1959) (Catco).
84 382 U.S. at 228; 360 U.S. at 392.
8 5 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAw REPoRT No. 689,
at 1 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
86 Area Rate Proceeding (South Louisiana Area), 25 F.P.C. 942 (1961).
87 382 U.S. at 227-28.
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extreme variance in profit returns among efficient producers would
seem to preclude all the rates' being just and reasonable. If the 1960
producer is not receiving a just and reasonable rate or if, indeed, the
1947 producer is receiving an unconscionable one, the rates should be
determined by a standard responsive to the annual costs of the reason-
ably efficient producer.
III. RELAXED SUPERVISION OF SMALL PRODUCERS
The Permian hearing examiner had come to the conclusion that
regulation of each and every producer was time-consuming and un-
necessary. Of the hundreds of producers selling in the Basin, "fewer
than 50 of them, each with national annual jurisdictional sales of
over 10 million Mcf., [thousand cubic feet] sell 94 percent of the
jurisdictional gas sold in Permian. Nationally some 75 large pro-
ducers make 82 percent of the national jurisdictional sales." "8 Further,
the position of the small independent producer would not seem to be
such as to encourage him to be the source of increases in rates as a
price leader.
The examiner's solution was to exempt all producers selling less
than ten million Mcf. annually from any filing requirements other
than an annual statement showing that sales were below that amount.
The small producer, the examiner advised, should receive a blanket
certificate of public convenience and necessity for all sales in the area.89
But while such an exemption would be of great aid to the Com-
mission's docket problem, it would serve to promulgate a fiction.
As to original sales of gas, the examiner's recommended treatment
seemed to constitute an unfounded declaration that all such future
transactions, so long as the small producer kept within the quantitative
limits, would satisfy the "public convenience and necessity." 0 As to
section 4 rate increases, the small producer could theoretically raise his
rates under the act without limitation and still have those rates
characterized as "just and reasonable." "' The examiner had not made
any special provision, with or without hearing, for insuring that the
small producer's rate would not surpass the area ceiling. As to all
producers, he had recommended invalidating favored nation clauses
retroactively,"2 and this at least would have avoided the triggering
88 Permian Area Rates, No. AR61-1, FPC, Sept. 17, 1964, pp. 145-46 (Examiner's
decision).
;s id. at 148-49, 181.
90 Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (c)
(1964), quoted in note 9 upra.
91Natural Gas Act §4(a), 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717c(a) (1964):
(a) All rates and charges made . . . by any natural-gas company . . . in
connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the juris-
diction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting .
such rates or charges, shall be just and reasonable . ...
92 Permian Area Rates, No. AR61-1, FPC, Sept. 17, 1964, pp. 176-77 (Examiner's
decision).
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effect of increases above the ceiling. 3  The Commission, however,
having concluded that the favored nation clauses should not be
abolished except prospectively,' felt that it must be able to limit the
small producer's pricing activities to the same extent it controlled those
of the large.
The Commission pointed out:
The impact of small producer prices on consumers is by no
means de minimis on an area basis, and is of great impact in
some situations. Sales by small producers constitute 80
percent of the gas supply of one pipeline and range from
9 percent to about 60 percent of the supply of the other 25
largest pipelines. While small producers represent only 15
percent of the aggregate interstate gas supply it is obvious
they are a substantial factor in the cost of the gas supply of
millions of American consumers.
Another consideration which weighs with us is that
penetration of rate ceilings, even on a small scale, could be
seriously disruptive of a pattern of uniform area ceilingsY.
The Commission therefore modified the examiner's disposition. Con-
currently with Permian it issued a rule that small producers would
receive "small producer certificates," under which sales at a rate not in
excess of the area ceiling need not be reported to the Commission."
Section 4 increases would be handled the same way. 7  Existing gas
contracts, like all Permian agreements, were to be adjusted downward
to the area limits if necessary,9 8 and pending applications were to
warrant certificates conditioned upon "acceptance of an initial price
no higher than the ceiling." " Initiation of rates in excess of the
ceiling would require individual Commission approval 100 to the same
extent that this was required for large producers.'
0 '
The solution seems far more sensible and helpful to the Com-
mission's goals than does the examiner's approach. There remains,
9 3 Whether the absence of triggering would have meant any lessening in the
actual number of increases sought is difficult to say. Certainly the producer retains
his right to seek an increase under such a system; he simply is not allowed to agree
upon it with the pipeline at the time of initial contracting. See note 114 infra and
accompanying text
9 4 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILrrY LAw REPoRT No. 689,
at 126 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
15 Id. at 122.
961d. at 124-25.
97Id. at 125. Section 4(d) of the act specifically permits Commission waiver
of the rate increase filing requirement in its discretion. Natural Gas Act §4(d), 52
Stat. 824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1964).
98 .Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTII=rY LAW REPoRT No. 689,
at 124 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
99 Id. at 130.
1o Id. at 125.
101 Id. at 113-14.
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however, the question whether the special treatment of small producers
is within the Commission's power under the Natural Gas Act.
To say that any and all small producer rates will automatically
be "just and reasonable" seems indeed to be an expansive inter-
pretation of the act's provision that "for the purposes of its rules and
regulations, the Commission may classify persons and matters within
its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes
of persons or matters." 102 Obviously the Commission's resolution
fits within this rubric more easily than did the suggestion of the
examiner. But it is not obvious from the words of the act that even
the Commission's choice will be allowable.
As precedent for the Commission's power to decline meaningful
jurisdiction over some producers, the examiner noted its unchallenged
exemption of "percentage producers." 103 The comparison is wide of
the mark. That exemption applies only to sales by a producer "to the
operator of a processing plant at a price which is a percentage of the
proceeds from the resale of the residue gas . ... ," 14 The reason
given in the regulation itself is that the processor-reseller is himself
bound to file for a section 7 certificate.' 5 The actual sale for resale in
commerce is thus regulated, and regulating the original producer's
price would be mere duplication. At the time he sells his gas to the
processor he either has no price, but only a percentage of a price un-
determined as yet, or, if the processor is already operating under a
section 7 certificate, a percentage of a price which the Commission
has already approved. How great a percentage the producer attracts
is irrelevant to the resale price's effect on commerce.'0" The exemption
of the percentage producer is thus of little aid to the examiner's position
that the small producer can be given special treatment amounting to
exemption from regulation.
Nevertheless, the logical relationship of the proposed treatment to
the Commission's solution of its regulatory problem seems to assure
its success in the courts; indeed, the Supreme Court has so suggested.
Another agency, the National Labor Relations Board, has long refused
jurisdiction over time-consuming matters that are of negligible effect
on interstate commerce. The Board has gone so far, without benefit
102 Natural Gas Act § 16, 52 Stat. 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1964).
103 Permian Area Rates, No. AR61-1, FPC, Sept. 17, 1964, p. 146 (Examiner's
decision).
10418 C.F.R. § 154.91(e) (1961).
105 Ibid.
106 Of course, the argument can be made that such a price is no more or less
relevant than is that of the normal producer, which is also, strictly speaking, prior
to the gas' actual sale in interstate commerce. But the price here involved is only
a percentage of a future price. Further, the Commission seems to retain the same
quantum of effective jurisdiction, i.e., control of the sale immediately prior to the
actual interstate sale. Since the reseller must process the gas to make it marketable
in commerce, the percentage producer might better be compared with a provider of
supplies or raw materials than with the normal producer.
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of any enabling statute, as to promulgate dollar volume minima below
which jurisdiction over a business' controversy will not attach.1 "
Supreme Court approval of both the Board's and the Commission's
regulations seems to have been rendered a certainty by the Court's
dictum in FPC v. Hunt: "
Procedures must be worked out, not only to clear up this
docket congestion, but also, to maintain a reasonably clear
current docket so that hearings may be had without inordi-
nate delay. In this connection the techniques of the National
Labor Relations Board might be studied with a view to
determining whether its exemption practices . . . might be
helpful in the solution of the Commission's problems."'
In such a circumstance it seems that even the examiner's solution
would have been sustained under the act. The Commission's solution
combines the best features of exemption and regulation, cutting down
unnecessary docket congestion and thereby saving both small producers
and the public substantial expense, while insuring the integrity of
the area ceiling and, in fact, affirmatively encouraging small producers'
staying within the ceiling's limits.
IV. THE MORATORIUM: CASTING OUT THE SECTION 4 DEVILS
The fact that Permian, which was "conducted with acute aware-
ness of the running of time," 110 was over four and one-half years in
completion before reaching court review indicates the probable truth
of the statement that section 5 "just and reasonable" hearings are
"inherently time-consuming proceedings." " For this reason the
Commission sought to preserve the integrity of its new rate ceilings
by the imposition of a two and one-half year moratorium, terminating
in 1968, on section 4 rate increase filings:
In the absence of such a moratorium the producers would
be free to file rate increases and continue to collect their
producer prices even though they exceeded the just and
reasonable rates herein prescribed. Without a moratorium,
the conclusion of one area proceeding would only signal the
beginning of the next, and just and reasonable rates for
consumers would always be one area proceeding away ...
Without the moratorium we have provided the public interest
could be protected only to the extent that the Commission
107 See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1957).
108 376 U.S. 515 (1,61).
109 Id. at 527.
110 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 109 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
111Ibid. Compare text accompanying note 84 mtpra.
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could devise procedures to enable it to complete an area
proceeding within the 5-month suspension period or shortly
thereafter."
2
Certainly this is true. The Commission's regulatory problems have
sprung in large measure from the flimsiness of section 4's bastions."'
The special treatment of small producers will mitigate this problem.
Accepting the hearing examiner's recommendation that favored nation
clauses be retroactively barred would have helped, too," 4 but the favored
nation proscription would work only to limit the parties' rate agree-
ment at the time of original filing; it would not prevent the producer
and the pipeline from later agreeing to an increase and, hence, a filing
and rate increase under section 4. The refund provision of section 4
is famous for its inadequacy to the task of consumer protection. The
refund money is tied up indefinitely, during which time the consumer
may well have changed his residence. The consumer's distributor
may not be bound by local law to return him his money in any case,
but only to reflect the windfall in its own rates. Meanwhile, there is
inevitable expense in the money's being filtered up through the gas
commerce chain and then back down again." 5  Finally, even absent
any "triggering" effect on federally regulated sales, a high rate will
tend to splash over into unregulated intrastate commerce, pushing
the entire market up unnecessarily."' But the question remains
whether the Commission's obvious need for a moratorium justifies
reading the producer's section 4 right to increase his rates out of
the act.
Despite wording that appears obvious, section 4 can perhaps be
read as conveying something less than an absolute right to increase
rates subject only to the Commission's short staying and refund
conditioning power. The Commission in Permian"7 adverted to the
Supreme Court's remark that the section "says only that a change
cannot be made without the proper notice to the Commission; it does
not say under what circumstances a change can be made." 118 That
statement, however, was made with reference to a producer's applica-
tion for an increase in derogation of his contract with a pipeline and
would not seem to shed any light on the Commission's power to
11 2 Id. at 108.
113 See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
114 Such clauses have been barred in new certification application contracts since
1961-62. 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1962). The Commission's power to reject, without
a bearing, applications containing such clauses was upheld in FPC v. Texaco, Inc.,
377 U.S. 33 (1964).
115 See FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 154-55 (1962); 112
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1964).
116 See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515,
524-25 (1964).
117 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTIrry LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 110 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
"is United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 339 (1956).
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limit section 4. The Commission seems, however, to have taken the
position that it is capable of as high a degree of control over rate
increase privileges, up to and including absolute prohibition, as are
the bargaining parties themselves:
It is our view that the filing of rate increases . . . can
be limited either by private contract or as a result of the
reasonable exercise of this Commission's authority under
Sections 5, 7 and 16 of the Act. Certainly, it would be an
anomalous situation if the filing of rate increases could be
restricted by private bargaining but not by reasonable exer-
cise of regulatory authority in the public interest." 9
But while it may readily be conceded that the situation is either
anomalous or anachronistic or, probably, both, Congress, which cer-
tainly had the option of placing increase filings under the same un-
limited Commission staying powers as it did original certificate re-
quests, 12 seems deliberately to have chosen this pattern. Obviously
the provision is a poor choice by Congress, but it is Congress' choice
nevertheless.
The Commission found power to prevent filings above the area
ceiling in its section 5 authorization to set a just and reasonable rate,
practice or contract "to be thereafter observed and in force," 121 and
in section 16, by which it can issue orders "necessary or appropriate
to carry out" the act's provisions. 22  It supported its conclusion 12.
with several Interstate Commerce Commission decisions 121 under the
Hepburn Act and a Supreme Court decision, United States v.
Corrick , 125 involving the Packers and Stockyards Act. While the
statutes involved in those cases are similar to provisions of the Natural
Gas Act, both provide for the agency's establishing maximum, not
merely "just and reasonable," rates.' 6 Each also provided that once
a maximum provision had been set, the regulated party should not
119 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTnIITY LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 109 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
120 Compare note 9 supra and accompanying text, with note 10 supra and accom-
panying text.
12Natural Gas Act §5(a), 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717d(a) (1964),
quoted note 80 supra.
12 Natural Gas Act § 16, 52 Stat. 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1964).
12 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 111-12 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
124 E.g., City of Springfield v. Louisville & N.R.R., 53 I.C.C. 603 (1919).
12 298 U.S. 435 (1936).
126 Interstate Commerce Act of 1906 (Hepburn Act) § 4, 34 Stat. 589, as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 15(1) (1964) :
[T]he Commission is authorized . . . whenever, after full hearing upon a
complaint . . . it shall be of the opinion that any of the rates . . . demanded,
charged, or collected . . . are unjust and unreasonable . . . to determine and
prescribe what will be the just and reasonable rate . . . to be thereafter
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publish or collect any higher one.' A power to set a maximum rate
implies an impenetrable ceiling; not so the case of the "just and
reasonable" rate. Further, far from these specific grants of power,
section 16 of the Natural Gas Act seems to have been intended only
to enable the Commission to run its own office in an efficient manner,
and not to add to the substance of its power over regulated parties.
128
Yet the FPC's acting to limit the availability of section 4's
comforts is neither a new nor a wholly untested device. Pipeline
certificates have been conditioned on the acceptance of a moratorium
on rate increases as early as 1939.129 Further, the Supreme Court's
Catco 0 decision attested to the Commission's power to exert in-
fluence upon the contractual arrangements of the parties by the im-
position of certificate conditions. Following Catco the Court has three
times upheld such conditions limiting the producer's resort to
section 4.
observed . . . and to make an order that the carrier shall cease and desist
from such violation .. .and shall not thereafter publish, demand, or collect
any rate . . . in excess of the maximum rate . . . so prescribed ....
Packers and Stockyards Act § 310, 53 Stat. 1351 (1939), 7 U.S.C. § 211 (1964)
Whenever after full hearing . . . the Secretary is of the opinion that any
rate . . . [is or will be] unjust [or] . . .unreasonable . . . the Secretary-
(a) May determine and prescribe what will be the just and reason-
able rate . . . to be thereafter . . .observed . . . as both the maximum
and minimum to be charged . . . and
(b) May make and order that such . . .operator
(1) shall cease and desist from such violation
(2) shall not thereafter publish, demand, or collect any rate
• . .more or less than the rate or charge so prescribed ....
27 Ibid. These provisions speak only to the naximum rate, not the just and
reasonable one. As to the latter, the acts provide only that, as in the case of the
Natural Gas Act, it is "to be thereafter observed." The Hepburn Act, which is § 2
of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 586, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 6
(1964), also requires that notice be given to the Commission before the initiation of
a new rate, and grants the Commission unlimited staying power pending approval
of the rate. 34 Stat. 586 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §6(3) (1964). The
Packers and Stockyards Act § 306(e), 42 Stat. 164 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1964),
like the Natural Gas Act, gives the Commission only a limited staying power after
notice. It may be that the Hepburn and Packers and Stockyards Acts differ from
the Natural Gas Act in having a dual function, that of setting maximum "ceiling"
rates, and that of adjudicating the justness and reasonableness of the rates within
that circumscription. One commentator has said:
Since under the Natural Gas Act, there is only one kind of rate, just and
reasonable for the case, and since Corrick was as a matter of fact dealing
with the other kind of rate, a set maximum, its relevance is questionable.
Comment, 54 GEo. L.J. 713, 717 n.30 (1966).
128 Natural Gas Act § 16, 52 Stat. 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1964):
The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to
prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations
as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
chapter. Among other things, such rules and regulations may define account-
ing, technical, and trade terms used in this chapter; and may prescribe the
form or forms of all statements, declarations, applications, and reports to be
filed with the Commission, the information which they shall contain, and the
time within which they shall be filed.
12 See Louisiana-Nevada Transit Co., 2 F.P.C. 546, 549 (1939).
18o Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959) (Catco).
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One situation involved the 1961-1962 orders forbidding favored
nation clauses in new contracts filed under section 7.13 There the
Court upheld the Commission's right to reject, without a hearing, an
application containing such clauses.132  That case, however, is of
questionable weight in supporting the imposition of a condition which
totally forecloses the producer's access to section 4 for any period of
time. The rule against favored nation clauses does not limit the
producer's right to request a rate increase; as previously, he may seek
the increase with the pipeline's approval. All the rule demands is that
the agreement be reached when the producer and the pipeline feel it
is merited, and not in advance of the original sale. The decision is
further weakened as support for the Commission's action by its re-
liance on precisely the proposition that the Commission now attempts
to deny, i.e., that the producer has a plenary right to file section 4
increases:
It must be remembered that under this Act rate increases
are initiated by the natural gas company, the Commission
having the burden by reason of § 4(e) of the Act to initiate
a hearing on their legality with only a limited power to
suspend new rates. 33
The Supreme Court did, however, uphold a moratorium on
section 4 increases in FPC v. Hunt 3 4 Reversing the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit,' 35 the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's
right to condition the granting of a temporary certificate under section
7(c) upon producer agreement not to file rate increases until a
permanent section 7 certificate should be granted. Section 7(c)
provides:
[T]he Commission may issue a temporary certificate in
cases of emergency, to assure maintenance of adequate
service or to serve particular customers, without notice or
hearing, pending the determination of an application for a
certificate . 1...36
The function of the temporary certificate is thus to allow gas to
be sold while the time-consuming section 7 procedure is in process.
The 7(c) certificate is clearly not dispositive of anyone's rights but
is a stopgap expedient, designed only to facilitate the bringing of
131 See note 114 supra.
132 FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
13 3 Id. at 42.
134 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
'35 Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1962).
136 Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 52 Stat 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (c)
(1964).
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gas into commerce in the discretion of the Commission. The Court
weighed these characteristics heavily:
When the independent producer knocks on the door of the
Commission for permission to enter his gas in interstate
commerce he must submit to the requirements of § 7. His
natural gas must be certificated before it can move into inter-
state commerce. If he wishes to avoid the delay incident to
a hearing for a permanent certificate he may apply for tempo-
rary authorization, which may be granted upon ex parte
application. In view of this, the Commission must have the
authority to condition a temporary certificate so as to avoid
irreparable injury to affected parties. This condition, once
imposed, continues only during the pendency of the producer's
application for a permanent certificate. In view of the
ex parte nature of the proceeding, it appears only fair to all
concerned that the condition upon which the rate was
temporarily certified be continued unchanged until the per-
manent certificate is issued.13'
The existence of broad discretionary power in the Com-
mission to condition temporary certificates appears to us to
be vital to its ability to hold the line in pricing. The extent
of that power in permanent certification is not before us
now . .188
Two Justices dissented on the theory that poor legislative judgment
was being replaced by legislative judging.13 9 But the case for the
temporary certificate moratorium is a good one. The producer, pend-
ing certification, has no right to sell his gas. He does have the option
of refusing temporary certification without prejudice to his applica-
tion."' He should not in fairness be allowed to accept a temporary
discretionary certificate and then attack the conditions to which it
has been subjected.
This reasoning led the Fifth Circuit to distinguish Hunt when,
in Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC,14' it confronted a moratorium upon
a permanent certificate. Here, however, the moratorium itself was
temporary. The producers' receipt of permanent certificates had been
137 376 U.S. at 523.
138 Id. at 526.
13 9 Id. at 527.
140 See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1959)
(Catco). Catco's facts clearly indicate that the producers had suffered no prejudice
to their permanent certificate application, despite their having twice refused temporary
certification at a lower rate.
141 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964).
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reversed ' in light of the Catco "in-line" doctrine. On remand in
1963 the Commission set new, lower rates according to the area "guide-
lines." " The in-line price was to be maintained without section 4
increase until termination of the South Louisiana area proceeding or
July 1, 1967, whichever was earlier. The court of appeals held that
such a condition was beyond the power of the Commission.'44
On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed, 45 citing Hunt:
We noted in [Hunt] . . . that "a triggering of price rises
often results from the out-of-line initial pricing of certificated
gas" and that the possibility of refund does not afford
sufficient protection. . . . [T]here was ample power under
§ 7(e) for the Commission to attach these conditions for
consumer protection during this interim period though the
certificate was not a temporary one . . . but a permanent
one, as in CATCO .... 16
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion, concurring in part, is more specific:
Recognizing force in the contrary view of the Court of
Appeals, I do not believe that § 4 must be read to bestow on
producers an invincible right to raise prices subject only to
a six-month delay and refund liability. . . . A freeze until
1967 is not permanent price fixing, and in this interregnum
between individual and area pricing, the hazard of irre-
versible price increases warrants imposing some brake. 4 7
Callery is substantially stronger authority for the Commission's
Permian moratorium than is Hunt. Not only was the Callery stay
imposed upon a permanent certificate, but that stay was imposed after
the initiation of service. The producers had been given permanent
section 7 certificates at a certain rate. After their acceptance of the
certificates, and the passage of the time in which they had the option
142 The reversals took place in the Supreme Court and in several of the circuit
courts. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 361 U.S. 195, vacating per curiam United
Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 269 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1959) ; United Gas Improvement
Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub num. Superior Oil Co. v. United
Gas Improvement Co., 366 U.S. 965 (1961); United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC,
290 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Sun Oil Co. v. United Gas Improvement
Co., 368 U.S. 823 (1961) ; United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 287 F.2d 159 (10th
Cir. 1961) ; Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 287 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied
sub nom. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 365 U.S. 880 (1961);
United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied sub
norn. Superior Oil Co. v. United Gas Improvement Co., 365 U.S. 879 (1961).
143 Placid Oil Co., 30 F.P.C. 283 (1963). The guidelines had been promulgated
to "hold the line" pending the determination of proper area rates in Permian and its
kin. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
144 Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964).
145 United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223 (1965).
146M Id. at 228-29. (Emphasis added.)
147 Id. at 232.
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of accepting or rejecting them, the certifications were appealed. 14 In
1965, the original certificates were reconditioned at a substantially
lower price and the producers, without option of withdrawing their
gas and selling it intrastate,149 were ordered not to raise their rates
for a period of time. It would thus seem that any argument by a
Permian producer that a moratorium cannot be imposed upon existing
certificates under any circumstances has been foreclosed.
Further, the Commission took pains in Permian to insure that
no producer will be forced to sell his gas at a rate lower than cost.
Claims of confiscation may be filed and, upon hearing, the Commission
will either allow abandonment of the service or, perhaps, in extreme
cases, allow adjusting of the rate above the area ceiling.15° To this
extent the Commission's Permian disposition is more solicitous of
producer interests than was that of Callery.
But Callery, like Hunt, places great stress on the fact that the
moratorium is being imposed only temporarily and will be lifted upon
the Commission's impending determination of a proper rate. In Hunt
this determination is the "public convenience and necessity" hearing
of section 7; in Callery the Court goes further, saying that, in light
of the proved impossibility of a full dress section 7 hearing without
substantial docket congestion, the producers must abide a Commission
determination of "just and reasonable" rates in the section 5 area
proceeding. Both cases stressed the fact that proper rates would be
found-151 and that, probably more important, only a temporary "sus-
pension" of the producer's section 4 privileges would allow such a
finding at a reasonable time." 2 The Permian moratorium does not
meet the first test employed in these decisions. Here the just and
14S Under the statute a party is allowed sixty days in which to appeal the Com-
mission's disposition of a matter. Natural Gas Act § 19(b), 52 Stat. 831 (1938),
15 U.S.C § 717r(b) (1964). Yet, by Commission regulation, 18 C.F.R. § 157.20(a)
(1961), a proffered certificate will be deemed rejected unless accepted within thirty
days. In Callery the appeal had not been filed until after the first thirty day period.
One producer argued before the Fifth Circuit that had it known an appeal would be
taken, it would not irrevocably have dedicated its gas to interstate commerce. Brief
for Petitioner Superior Oil Co., p. 42, Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1964). Of course, such a change of rate after final dedication is always
to be anticipated, by way of a § 5 "just and reasonable" hearing.
i49 The ability to abandon service is narrowly circumscribed under the act:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by
means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commis-
sion first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Com-
mission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that
the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public
convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.
Natural Gas Act § 7(b), 52 Stat. 824 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717f(b) (1964).
15 0 See Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILIY LAw REPORT No.
689, at 104-06 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
151.Unite Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 228-30
(1965); FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515, 523-24 (1965).
152 Ibid.
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reasonable rate has already been determined; that is what the proceed-
ing was all about.
Callery and Hunt would certainly offer no support to a permanent
moratorium on section 4 rate increases. Further, it seems clear that
they would not support a temporary moratorium without a rationale.
The cases seem to require that some regulatory emergency exist which
makes the holding of increase filings in abeyance a necessity. Further,
it should not be enough that the Commission has a problem; the
moratorium must contribute to the final solution of that problem rather
than as a mere postponement device. The Permian opinion offers no
hint as to what this problem might be.
It is clear that, absent a moratorium, the Commission may
continue to have docket problems." 3 But, insofar as the Permian
Basin is concerned, none of these problems will be cured by imposition
of a moratorium; they will only be held at bay for a while. Permian
has already regulated the rates of all flowing gas in the Basin. Thus
the only contributions to the docket snarl coming from that area would
seem to be initial certification proceedings and section 4 increase
filings. These types of proceedings, however, will presumably still
be around in 1968. But these are the only problems to which the
opinion adverts. 54
There is, of course, one view under which the moratorium could
be characterized as being of the temporary type allowed in Callery and
Hunt, i.e., one which contributes to the solution of a temporary
Commission regulating problem. Permian sets the just and reasonable
rate for only one part of the nation. It is conceivable that rate increase
filings in the Permian Basin might be more likely to contribute to
docket havoc today than they would in 1968 because several other
rate proceedings are pending 155 and some individual certification and
rate increase applications are in progress throughout the non-Permian
producing areas. 5' In such a situation the Permian moratorium might
be sustainable. However, as each succeeding rate proceeding elim-
inated its share of docket problems, moratoria would become less
allowable and, ultimately, insupportable. But nowhere in its opinion
does the Commission mention the non-Permian docket pressures as
contributing to its conclusion that a moratorium is necessary. It is
thus hard to characterize this problem as the moratorium's moving
cause. Further, since the Commission offers no findings of fact as to
153 See text accompanying note 112 supra.
'4 Ibid.
'55 Area Rate Proceeding (Hugoton-Anadarko Ariea), 30 F.P.C. 1354 (1963);
Area Rate Proceeding (South Louisiana Area), 25 F.P.C. 942 (1961). These pro-
ceedings, along with Permian, are expected to set area rates covering 75% of the
gas flowing in interstate commerce. Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area),
UTrY LAw REPoRT No. 689, at 10 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
156 For example, the applications involved in Callery had been severed from the
South Louisiana area proceeding docket in the interests of expedience. United Gas
Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 226 (1965).
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whether non-Permian section 7 and 4 proceedings make the mora-
torium necessary, a reviewing court would seem to have no way of
telling whether the stay is justified under the operant facts.
At the same time, the Commission provides itself with an
alternative, one which gives an inkling that what is actually planned
is indefinite limitation of the producer's access to section 4. The area
ceiling is not to be passed before January 1, 1968
unless within such time, either upon the Commission's own
motion or upon an adequately supported petition by some
interested party, the Commission at its discretion decides to
reopen this proceeding to consider whether a different rate
• . should be adopted for sales certificated at subsequent
periods. 5
It is not unreasonable to apprehend that the Commission might intend
to establish a pattern of imposing a moratorium, occasionally reopen-
ing the area proceeding, adjusting the rate and imposing a new "tempo-
rary" moratorium at a slightly higher ceiling. Perhaps under such a
system the producer would ultimately fare no better or worse than
under the statutory procedure of section 4.158 Nevertheless it would
seem to be as much a Commission amendment of the act as a permanent
moratorium would be. In either case section 4 is effectively circum-
scribed within the Commission's discretion. The producer's right to
initiate a new rate would be permanently limited to those rates bearing
the Commission's imprimatur. Such a scheme would be better for
the consumer,' but that is not the way Congress wrote the act.
The reviewing court must therefore be extremely careful to plumb
the real nature of this Permian moratorium. If its function is merely
to form the first link in a permanent chain of temporary stays, tied
together by occasional updatings of the ceiling, it should be reversed
as an administrative attempt at statutory amendment. If, on the
other hand, the basis for the Commission's imposition of the mora-
torium is the presence of other docket-crowding FPC activities, which
are now a preemptive problem but will not be in 1968 by reason of
the moratorium's clearing the decks, then perhaps the moratorium
can be sustained. In that event the court will have the duty of satisfy-
ing itself-and a remand on this question might be necessary-that
these soluble conditions do exist and will be mitigated to such an
extent as to justify the moratorium. Further, the court should avoid
considering those regulatory problems which spring not from a present
soluble condition, but from the nature of the regulatory statute and
157 Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), UTILITY LAW REPORT No. 689,
at 113 (FPC Aug. 5, 1965).
158 This is so in light of § 4's refund provision. Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 52
Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1964).
15o See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
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the subject matter being regulated. Solution of these latter conditions
lies not with the agency or the court but with Congress.
CONCLUSION
Each of the Commission's Permian innovations discussed in this
Comment will, if upheld, play an effective role in protecting the long
suffering consumer of natural gas. The area rating system will not
only relieve the Commission of the docket congestion incidental to
individual cost-of-service ratemaking, but will also guard against the
initiation of service at rates that are too high because unduly profitable
or based upon indefensible costs. Meanwhile, setting a future Gas Well
Gas rate high enough will insure the future availability of gas to the
interstate market. Relaxed supervision of small producers will clear
the decks of largely unnecessary matters while encouraging small
producer adherence to the rate ceilings. Both the producer's and the
public's time and money will be saved. The moratorium, finally, will
prevent the use of section 4 to initiate insupportable rate hikes pending
determination on the merits. In the present posture of the record,
however, only the special treatment of small producers seems clearly
sustainable.
The two-price system, as effected by Permian, is insupportable;
it puts the early gas producer's hand far too deep into the consumer's
pocket. Probably, too, the producers of more recent years culminating
in 1960 are being insufficiently compensated for their labors. Cer-
tainly the Permian scheme allows the profit percentage of the reason-
ably efficient producer to vary greatly depending upon when he found
his gas. A court reviewing Permian should thus reverse this deter-
mination, demanding that if cost-based rates are to be utilized, the
resulting rates must actually reflect the real costs of the producer of
average industry efficiency for the year-or similar cost group of
years-in which the gas was found. This disposition would also
soften the indefensible chasm between the rates of the 1960 and 1961
producers. The Commission's defense that such annual determinations
would be impossible finds no support in the record; that they would
be difficult is no answer.
The temporary moratorium on section 4 rate increases is a dif-
ferent matter. Although the Commission has made a flimsy case in
support of its power to impose such a moratorium, there is a possi-
bility that the moratorium can be sustained. To be affirmed the Com-
mission's record will require amplification on the question whether
temporary docket congestion will be eliminated by reason of the
moratorium. The condition giving rise to this congestion must itself
be temporary, susceptible to remedy by the Commission, and must
certainly not be that congestion growing out of the nature of section
4 itself. Even if such justification is found, however, the court should
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make it clear that post-area proceeding moratoria are allowable only
until such time as non-area proceeding docket problems are substan-
tially eliminated. If, on the other hand, no proof of such justification
can be made, then the moratorium must be overturned. This, of
course, might sap the vitality of the Commission's Permian rate deter-
minations; perhaps just and reasonable rates always will be one area
proceeding away. But the solution of that problem can come only
from Congress.
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APPENDIX
WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST INDEX OF GAS WELL GAS
PRODUCED IN 1960, UNITED STATES (1960--100)
Table I
Index of Drilling and Equipping
Cost/Mcf Reserves Added
Dr. Foster
50.6
53.7
55.6
57.9
62.2
66.6
70.6
74.5
78.5
83.5
90.3
92.9
97.5
Dr. Joskow
62.4
61.0
63.9
70.7
71.0
90.7
96.2
107.8
99.1
91.8
87.6
91.8
Table II
Estimated Reserves of Gas Well Gas Added:
Percentage Contribution to 1960 Production
Dr. Foster
3.86
4.35
4.19
4.35
5.01
5.42
8.23
2.80
9.41
10.83
8.75
8.00
8.09
83.29
Dr. Joskow
3.97
3.63
4.81
4.50
5.11
8.15
2.99
6.76
8.12
8.60
9.23
8.04
73.91
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1947-59
